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Tying Arrangements in the Real Estate
Market: Federal Antitrust Law and
Local Land Development Policy
By HERBERT HOVENKAMP*
A tying arrangement is an offer or agreement to sell or lease a
certain product only on the condition that the buyer agree to take a
different product as well. Under certain conditions, such arrangements
are condemned by both federal and state antitrust laws.' In recent
years, some sellers of housing have combined home sales with sales or
leases of related items, such as financing, security, access to recreational
facilities, maintenance, and other services. Sales of such items in-
dependent of the home sale create no antitrust problems, but when the
seller requires the lease or purchase of the secondary product or service
as part of the purchase of the housing unit, the sale may be subject to
attack as an illegal tying arrangement.
The following real property transactions have been condemned by
courts as illegal tying arrangements: (1) X sells a house trailer lot only
on the condition that the buyer also buy the trailer itself from X2 (2) X,
a realtor, sells a home subject to a covenant that when the home is
resold it must be listed for sale by X's real estate agency; 3 (3) X sells a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
B.A., 1969, Calvin College; M.A., 1971; Ph.D., 1976; J.D., 1978, University of Texas.
1. See, e.g., Northerfi Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Serv. Bureau, 4
Cal. 3d 842, 484 P.2d 953, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1971); Connecticut State Medical Soe'y v.
Connecticut Medical Serv., Inc., 29 Conn. Supp. 474, 293 A.2d 794 (Super. Ct. 1971); People
ex rel. Scott v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 21 Il1. App. 3d 97, 315 N.E.2d 124 (1974); Big
Top Stores, Inc. v. Ardsley Toy Shoppe, Ltd., 64 Misc. 2d 894, 315 N.Y.S.2d 897, (Sup. Ct.
1970), a.f'dmem., 36 A.D. 2d 582, 318 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1971). Cf. Pram Labs., Inc. v. Pram
Laboratories-South, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 533 ('rex. Civ. App. 1969) (agreement not to sell com-
petitive products).
2. Under federal antitrust law: Ware v. Trailer Mart, Inc., 623 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir.
1980). Under state law: Suburban Mobile Homes, Inc. v. AMFAC Communities, Inc., 101
Cal. App. 3d 532, 161 Cal. Rtpr. 811 (1980); People v. Mobile Magic Sales, Inc., 96 Cal. App.
3d 1, 157 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1979); see also Sherman v. Mertz Enterprises, 42 Cal. App. 3d 769,
117 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1974); Bigos v. Nationwide Mobile Home Parks, Inc. 105 Mich. App. 11,
306 N.W.2d 373 (1981).
3. See Connecticut v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
residential lot on the condition that X build the structure to be erected
on it or that X provide the building materials for the structure to be
erected on it;4 (4) X sells a lot and requires the purchaser to obtain
certain goods or services from X's business.5
Recent cases have attempted further extensions of federal antitrust
law into the real property market.6 In these cases, plaintiffs have chal-
lenged the right of a condominium developer to condition the sale of
condominium units on the buyer's agreement to purchase or lease a
share of common land.7 If the plaintiffs prevail, federal antitrust laws
may be brought into conflict with local land use policy, as expressed in
statutes requiring developers to provide a certain amount of open space
with new condominiums.8
This Article examines the applicability of section 1 of the Sherman
Act9 and section 3 of the Clayton Act10 to the tying of condominium
units with other products or services. It suggests that such laws should
not be applied when they conflict with clearly articulated local land use
policy. The Article first discusses the jurisdictional "commerce" re-
quirements of the two acts and concludes that commerce jurisdiction
over such tying arrangements will usually exist. It then inquires
63,881 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981); Connecticut v. Hossan-Maxwell, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 63,471 (Conn. 1980); MJS Real Properties, Ltd. v. Oregon, 1981 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 998, at D-5 (Or. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 1980). These cases all were
decided under state law.
4. See People ex rel. Scott v. Schwulst Bldg. Center, 92 Ill. App. 3d 552, 414 N.E.2d
1375 (1981) (state law). See generally Sobrato v. Prudential Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 786 (9th Cir.
1980) (federal law); People ex rel. Scott v. College Hills Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 651, 415
N.E.2d 1048 (1981) (state law).
5. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Rhode Island v. Allied
Fuel Co., 1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,354 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1980); see also Bass v. Boston Five
Cent Savings Bank, 478 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1979); Hawaii v. Mililani Town, Inc. 1980-2
Trade Cas. 63,503 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1980) (consent decree).
6. See, e.g., Chatham Condominium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002
(5th Cir. 1979); Spitz v. Buchwald, 551 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1977); Imperial Point Colannades
Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian, 549 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859
(1977); Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 533 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); Sandles v. Ruben, 89 F.R.D. 635 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Fifth Moor-
ings Condominium, Inc. v. Shere, 81 F.R.D. 712 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
7. See Chatham Condominium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1013
(5th Cir. 1979). In a recent case, a district court concluded that defendants lacked the requi-
site market power in the local condominium market, and that the tying and tied items, a
condominium and its swimming pool, did not constitute two separate products as required
for application of federal antitrust law. See Levinson v. Maison Grande, Inc., 517 F. Supp.
963 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
8. See notes 107-18 & accompanying text infra.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
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whether such arrangements violate the substantive provisions of the an-
titrust laws, and, if so, whether such arrangements fall within the state
action exemption. It concludes that, although the tying of condomini-
ums to some facilities and services might violate the Sherman Act and
might not be spared by the state action exemption, the antitrust laws
were not intended to supersede most local land use policy and, in de-
ciding whether there are two products or only one, federal courts
should defer to local laws that require the tying of condominium sales
to sales of facilities or services.
Basic Elements of Tying Arrangements
Despite disagreement among scholars on the use and benefits of
tying arrangements,'" the courts have developed a fairly sophisticated
theory of how tying arrangements work and why they are bad. The
traditional judicial theory is that sellers use tying arrangements to cre-
ate "leverage": to use monopoly power in the tying product to create a
monopoly in the tied product, thereby making monopoly profits in two
products instead of one.12 The antitrust laws may be found to prohibit
tying arrangements when they inhibit competition in the market for the
tied product.' 3
Tying arrangement cases may be brought under either section 1 of
11. See, e.g., Bowman, TyingArrangements andthe Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957); Posner, Exclusionary Practices andthe Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CH. L. REv. 506 (1974);
Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50
(1958); see also Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Recprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 552 (1965); Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciorocity and the Leverage The-
ory, 76 YALE LJ. 1397 (1967); Markovits, Part 11" Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Anti-
trust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970). The articles by Bowman, Posner, and Turner generally
reject the judicial theory that a tyer can use tying arrangements to create "leverage"--that is,
use market power in the tying product to create market power in the tied product. All three
authors conclude that tying arrangements should be condemned in a relatively narrow range
of circumstances. Recently, some authors have rejected the Bowman, Posner, Turner analy-
sis and have opted for broader liability. Bauer, .4 Simplfed Approach to Tying Arrange-
ments: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 VAND. L. Rnv. 283 (1980); Slawson, A Stronger,
Simpler Tie-in Doctrine, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 671 (1980).
12. See generally L. SULLWAN, ANTITRUST 432-71 (1977). But see Bowman, Tying Ar-
rangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Posner, Exclusionary Prac-
tices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506 (1974); Turner, The Validity of Tying
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50 (1958).
13. In International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), for example, the
court condemned an arrangement in which the defendant leased its patented salt processing
equipment only to persons who also agreed to buy their salt from the defendant. The de-
fendant had monopoly control of the market for processing machinery because of the patent,
but the market for salt was competitive. The lessees of the equipment might have preferred
to buy their salt on the open market under more favorable arrangements. The tying ar-
rangement prevented this free choice.
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the Sherman Act 14 or section 3 of the Clayton Act.15 Section 3 of the
Clayton Act was intended by its drafters to prohibit tying arrange-
ments.' 6 Its terms are limited, however, to restraints on sales or leases
of goods or commodities. Therefore, section 3 has been held not to
apply to services' 7 or transactions in land.' 8 Because of these jurisdic-
tional limitations, tying cases have also been brought under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.19
The precise test for labelling a particular transaction as an illegal
tying arrangement under the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act is uncer-
tain because the courts have not agreed on a unitary rule. Most courts
have held that the Sherman Act prohibits tying arrangements on stan-
dards similar to those required under the Clayton Act, but some cases
indicate that the tests differ.20
The prevailing direction of judicial opinion, however, is towards a
unitary test. For example, in 1980 the Second Circuit held in Yentsch v.
Texaco, Inc. 21 that tying plaintiffs generally must show:
[Fjirst, [separate] tying and tied product[s], . . . second, evidence of
actual coercion by the seller that in fact forced the buyer to accept
the tied product .... third, sufficient economic power held by the
seller in the tying product market to coerce purchaser acceptance of
the tied product, . . . fourth, anticompetitive effects in the tied mar-
ket .... and fifth, involvement of a 'not insubstantial' amount of
interstate commerce in tying the tied product market .... 22
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
16. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517
(1917).
17. See Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olster Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 661 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974).
The government has taken the position that advertising is not a "commodity" within the
meaning of the Clayton Act, although the Supreme Court has expressed no opinion on this
point. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 n.27 (1953).
18. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 13 n.1 (1958) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); see International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) (action brought under both Sherman and Clayton Acts).
20. See notes 53-57 & accompanying text infra.
21. 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980).
22. Id. at 56-57; see also Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108, 117-
18 (C.D. Cal. 1978). Many courts employ a three-part test similar to that used in Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972):
"First, . . . the scheme in question involves two distinct items and provides that one (the
tying product) may not be obtained unless the other (the tied product) is also purchased.
Second, . . . the tying product possesses sufficient economic power appreciably to restrain
competition in the tied product market. Third, . . . a 'not insubstantial' amount of com-
merce is affected by the arrangement." (emphasis in original). Recently, a growing number
of courts have minimized the requirement of involvement of a "not insubstantial" amount of
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Before the plaintiff may address these substantive issues, however, fed-
eral jurisdiction must be established.
Federal Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Real Property Transactions
The federal antitrust laws are authorized by the commerce clause
of the United States Constitution, which permits Congress to regulate
"Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. '23
The commerce power is broad and can be applied to many activities in
or affecting interstate commerce.
In passing the Sherman Act, Congress "exercised all the power it
possessed" to regulate interstate commerce.24 The Supreme Court has
held that the Sherman Act creates subject matter jurisdiction with re-
spect to all restraints of trade "in or affecting" interstate commerce.25
The jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act is coextensive with the
constitutional limits on federal power under the commerce clause.
The jurisdictional reach of the Clayton Act, on the other hand, is
more limited. Section 3 of the Clayton Act applies only to restraints
that are "in the flow" of interstate commerce.26 As a result, Clayton
Act claims are sometimes dismissed for insufficient effect on interstate
commerce, while Sherman Act claims rarely are dismissed for this
reason.27
The federal courts generally find jurisdiction under the commerce
clause if they perceive that a given restraint has measurable interstate
consequences. Although residential real property transactions might
appear to involve only one state, a land sale often is "in" commerce or
has a sufficient "effect" on commerce to bring it within the reach of
federal antitrust jurisdiction.28 A satisfactory test for federal antitrust
interstate commerce in the tied product market. See, e.g., Ware v. Trailer Mart, Inc., 623
F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1980).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); see Western
Waste Serv. Systems v. Universal Waste Controls, 616 F.2d 1094, 1096 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
25. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976); Burke v.
Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967) (per curiam).
26. See United States v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271,'283 (1975); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1974). Section 7 of the Clayton Act was
amended in 1980 to apply to activities affecting commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), as
amendedby Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980 § 6(a), Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94
Stat. 1157. The amendment, however, does not apply to the rest of the Clayton Act.
27. But see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 230-33 (1947); Alabama
Homeowners, Inc. v. Findahome Corp., 1981-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,915 (5th Cir. 1981);
Heille v. City of St. Paul, 512 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1981).
28. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
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jurisdiction in the real estate industry has not yet been developed, how-
ever, and Supreme Court decisions have been only moderately helpful.
In 1975, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the interstate
nature of real property transactions in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.29
The Court held that publication by a county bar association of a fee
schedule for real estate title examinations violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The circuit court had held that the Sherman Act did not
reach title-examination price-fixing because the restraint was entirely
local and any effect it might have had on interstate commerce was
merely incidental or remote.3 0 In reversing the circuit court, the
Supreme Court found that the real property transactions that created
the need for title examinations were frequently interstate transactions.
A significant portion of funds used for financing home purchases in the
county3' came from outside the state, many home loans were guaran-
teed by either the United States Veterans Administration or the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, and title insurance was
provided by out-of-state companies. 32 The court found that a fixed fee
schedule for title searches affected these purchases because a title
search was required as a practical matter for most home purchases
financed by third-party mortgagees.33 According to the Court, there-
fore, the fixed fee schedule was sufficiently connected with the inter-
state aspects of real estate transactions to invoke the Sherman Act. 34
The Goldfarb approach to commerce clause jurisdiction left some
questions unanswered. For example, Goldfarb could be interpreted to
suggest that, if a certain service is provided in a real estate transaction,
then any antitrust violation involving that service will be within the
reach of the Sherman Act, provided that a significant number of homes
in the area are financed from out-of-state sources or that title insurance
is provided by out-of-state companies. Under this interpretation, there
need be no showing that the allegedly illegal activities had any effect on
interstate commerce.
On the other hand, Goldfarb could be interpreted to apply only to
restraints on services that as a practical matter are necessary to the
29. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
30. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773
(1975).
31. The county involved in Goldfarb was Fairfax County, Virginia.
32. 421 U.S. at 778, 783 n.8.
33. The Court observed that "[fi]n financing realty purchases lenders require, 'as a con-
dition of making the loan, that the title to property involved be examined .... ' " Id. at 784
(quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 494 (E.D. Va. 1973)).
34. Id. at 785.
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purchase of a home. Title insurance, the service at issue in Goldfarb,
is essential for the relatively large class of purchasers who must obtain
third-party financing.35 In contrast, commission-fixing agreements
among realtors might not meet the Goldfarb test because a buyer is able
to purchase or sell a home in most communities without employing a
real estate agent.36
In McLain v. Real Estate Board,37 the Supreme Court provided
some additional guidance. The McLain Court held that agreements
among realtors to fix commissions for listing and selling services were
subject to Sherman Act attack. Although it did not discuss the neces-
sity of the service to the transaction, the McLain court held that the
service or product need not be essential to have a sufficient effect on
interstate commerce to create antitrust jurisdiction.38
In McLain, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had trans-
acted business for "persons moving into and out of the Greater New
Orleans area" and that the defendants had assisted some purchasers
in obtaining financing and insurance that came from out-of-state
sources. 39 In dismissing the complaint in McLain, both the district and
circuit courts divided each real estate transaction into various compo-
nent activities, and held that the defendants' price-fixing arrangement
concerned only intrastate activities. 40
Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court observed that the
Sherman Act applies to activities that either are "in" interstate com-
merce or "affect" it. The Court concluded that, under the Sherman
Act, the plaintiffs could show "either that the defendants' activity is
itself in interstate commerce or, if it is local in nature, that it has an
effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in interstate
commerce. ' 41 Moreover, the plaintiffs "need not make the more par-
35. Id. at 784.
36. Some courts reached this conclusion, or a similar one, after the Goldfarb decision.
See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 432 F. Supp. 982, 984-85 (E.D. La. 1977), appeal dismissed,
583 F.2d 1315, 1322 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated, 444 U.S. 232 (1980); see also Income Realty &
Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1319 (10th Cir.).
37. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
38. See id. at 244.
39. Id. at 235.
40. The district court suggested that, although financing and title insuring might be
interstate activities, brokerage is a completely intrastate activity, and the plaintiffs had not
alleged interstate commission fixing. Brokers did not become involved in title examinations
or financing, but, as a general rule, only brought the buyer and a potential mortgagee to-
gether, who then worked out their own financing arrangements. See McLain v. Real Estate
Bd., 432 F. Supp. 982, 985 (E.D. La. 1977), appeal dismissed, 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978),
-vacated, 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
41. 444 U.S. at 242. The McLain Court explained that in Goldfarb it had applied the
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ticularized showing of an effect on interstate commerce caused by the
alleged conspiracy to fix commission rates." 42 If the general activity of
real estate brokerage has some effect on interstate commerce, then
Sherman Act jurisdiction will exist even if the plaintiff cannot show
that the antitrust violation itself had any measurable impact on inter-
state commerce.
After McLain, it appears that Sherman Act jurisdiction will reach
most restraints involving sales of housing. The plaintiff can probably
demonstrate sufficient interstate commerce for jurisdiction merely by
showing that many out-of-state buyers obtain financing or title insur-
ance from out-of-state sources. 43 Transactions in real estate involving
significant interstate movement of purchasers or sellers also would
seem to be subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction.44 In a case involving
the allegation of tying home purchases to the purchase of building
materials or construction contracts, a showing that a significant amount
of the building materials have moved in interstate commerce will prob-
ably establish jurisdiction.45 In addition, a showing that a tying ar-
rangement has discouraged potential out-of-state competitors from
entering the market is probably adequate. 46
The Substantive Law of Tying Arrangements
The Tied Product's Interstate Market
Under the "affecting commerce" test of McLain, a plaintiff need
only demonstrate that the defendant's activities somehow affect inter-
state commerce for federal jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.47 The
substantive tests for tying arrangements, however, generally require
that the plaintiff show "involvement of a 'not insubstantial' amount of
"in commerce" test. Its holding there was based on the finding that title examinations were
"'an integral part' of the interstate transaction of obtaining financing for the purchase of
residential property." Id. at 244. McLain, on the other hand, was decided under the "affect-
ing commerce" test, which requires only that the plaintiff "demonstrate a substantial effect
on interstate commerce generated by respondents' brokerage activity." Id. at 242.
42. Id. at 242.
43. See id at 245.
44. See id.; see also Chatham Condominium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d
1002, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1979).
45. See Chatham Condominium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1006
(5th Cir. 1979).
46. Id. at 1010. The court cited the fact that "out-of-state companies were discouraged
from entering the West Palm Beach area because the market for recreational facilities was
effectively tied up" by the tying arrangements.
47. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
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interstate commerce in the tied product market," 48 suggesting a plain-
tiff may prevail only if it shows that a sufficient volume of the tied
product was sold in markets involving interstate commerce.49
Thus, when a plaintiff can show that a particular tying arrange-
ment restrains "a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce in
the tied product market," it would also thereby show a sufficient effect
on commerce to create Sherman Act jurisdiction. Courts determining
commerce clause jurisdiction under the Sherman Act should look di-
rectly at the tied product market to determine if the proper effect on
interstate commerce exists, although this process intertwines the issue
of jurisdictional reach under the Constitution with the substantive of-
fense of tying. The Fifth Circuit has taken this approach.50
As to tying claims brought under the Clayton Act, however, alle-
gations of an effect on interstate commerce in the market of the tied
product are not sufficient for a finding of jurisdiction; a plaintiff also
must show that the defendant's activities were in the flow of com-
merce.5 ' For this showing, a court looks generally to the defendant's
activities rather than specifically to the tied product.5 2
Thus, when a court is considering a tying action brought under the
Sherman Act, it may determine the effect on commerce in the tied
product market and, in the process, determine both the commerce
clause jurisdictional issue and one part of the substantive test for tying.
48. Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 1980); accord Chatham Condo-
minium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1008, n.8 (5th Cir. 1979).
49. In Chatham Condominium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1008 n.8
(5th Cir. 1979), which involved tying in a condominium market, the court stated that the
tying test required, inter alia, a showing of both a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate
commerce in the tied market and "anticompetitive effects in the tied market."
For example, when a trailer park developer leases lots only to those who buy trailers,
the transactions probably have had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to give rise to a
cause of action under the Sherman Act, because the manufacture or financing of the trailers,
the tied product, probably involves out-of-state activities. In the reverse situation, however,
when the developer sells trailers only to people who also lease its lots, the developer's acts
might not create jurisdiction because the leasing of a trailer lot, the tied product, may be a
purely local activity. See Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Managers Ass'n, 422 F.2d 836
(6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (bare allegation that plaintiff-lessees were apartment residents
and defendant-lessors were property owners in college town of Ann Arbor, Michigan, was
insufficient to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
50. See, e.g., Chatham Condominium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002
(5th Cir. 1979). The defendant had sold condominiums only to people who also agreed to
share in a lease of recreational land and facilities. The court held that, in the process of
making out the substantive claim that the defendant's activity restrained a substantial
amount of interstate commerce in the tied product, the plaintiff also showed sufficient effect
on commerce to create jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. Id. at 1009-10.
51. See id. at 1010.
52. See id at 1010-II.
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When the court is considering a Clayton Act tying claim, however, it
must consider first whether the defendant's activities generally are in
the flow of commerce. If a Clayton Act tying plaintiff satisfies the flow
of commerce requirement, the court must then determine whether there
is a sufficient effect on interstate commerce in the market of the tied
product.
Tying Tests Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts
In 1953, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,53 Jus-
tice Clark detailed the differences between the Sherman Act and Clay-
ton Act tying tests. The defendants required that businesses place their
advertisements in both its morning and evening newspapers. The gov-
ernment sued under the Sherman Act because it regarded advertising
as a "service" and not as a "commodity" under section 3 of the Clayton
Act.54
Justice Clark began with the premise that the Clayton Act was
passed to condemn activity that the Sherman Act had been held not to
condemn. Therefore, reasoned Justice Clark, one would expect the
Sherman Act to apply to a narrower range of activities than the Clay-
ton Act. 55
Justice Clark concluded that, when a tying action is brought under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must show both that the
seller has sufficient monopoly power in the tying product to restrain
competition in the tied product and that a substantial volume of com-
merce in the tied product is restrained. 56 Under section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act, however, the plaintiff need show only one of these
conditions. 57
Since Times-Picayune was decided, Justice Clark's distinction be-
tween the Acts has increasingly been disregarded. Several jurisdictions
have adopted a single test for violations of either Act, which resembles
the traditional, two-prong Sherman Act test: a plaintiff must show both
monopoly power in the tying product and restraint of competition in
53. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
54. Id. at 609 n.27.
55. Id. at 606-10. One could argue, however, that by enacting section 3 of the Clayton
Act Congress intended to declare a policy with respect to tying arrangements that had not
been recognized in the Sherman Act. Before the Clayton Act was passed, the Supreme
Court held that the Sherman Act did not reach tying arrangements. See Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co., 224 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1912).
56. Id. at 608-09.
57. Id.
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the tied product.5 8
Real Property and Market Power
Federal antitrust law can reach many restraints in the residential
real estate industry. Other principles of federalism, however, are rele-
vant to the question of how deeply the antitrust laws should go into the
local housing market. There is no evidence that the framers of the fed-
eral antitrust laws intended the laws to preempt local land use controls.
As a result, it would be appropriate for federal judges to defer to local
policy when considering federal antitrust attacks in the housing market.
Moreover, the substantive law of tying arrangements allows judicial
deference to state decisionmaking in the real property area.
One requirement of the law of tying is that a defendant have suffi-
cient market power in the tying product to restrain competition in the
tied product. Over the years, the federal courts have developed a list of
"suspect" tying products that are presumed to give their owners a suffi-
cient amount of market power. In general, any tying product that is
"unique," because it is patented,5 9 copyrighted, 60 trademarked, 61 or
58. In 1977, the Ninth Circuit noted that "[t]he practical difference between the two
standards has eroded steadily since Justice Clark's attempt to draw a fine line ... " Moore
v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1977).
Many courts disregard the distinction set out in Times-Picayune and apply a unitary
test. See Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1980) (Sherman Act); Elec-
troglas, Inc. v. Dynatex Corp., 497 F. Supp. 97, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (Sherman and Clayton
Acts). Other courts note the distinction, but decide the cases as if the distinction did not
exist. See Rental Car of New Hampshire, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 496 F. Supp.
373, 379 (D. Mass. 1980). Still other courts hold that the distinction is no longer valid. See
In re Data General Corp. Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 1980). Today it
appears to be the law of both the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit that there is no opera-
tive, substantive distinction between the two tests. See Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers,
581 F.2d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 1978); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1214
(9th Cir. 1977). See generaloy 16A J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTI-
TRUST AND TRADE REGULATION § 6G.05 (1981). There may still be a "rule of reason" tying
test governing cases in which the plaintiff is unable to prove both economic power in the
tying product and a restraint of competition in the tied product. See Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner 1). Recent federal case law
has generally played down the notion of distinct "per se" and "rule of reason" tying tests. In
Ware v. Trailer Mart, Inc., 623 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1980), however, the Sixth Circuit permit-
ted a plaintiff to proceed to trial on a rule of reason theory, alleging that the defendant had
tied mobile home purchases to leases of lots in its trailer park. The Sixth Circuit found that
economic power in the tying product is "relevant only if [the plaintiff] intends to prove a per
se violation of Section ." Id. at 1153. However, when making out a rule of reason claim, a
plaintiff need not show appreciable market power in the tying product or a substantial effect
on interstate commerce in the tied product.
59. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
60. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962); United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
61. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972).
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highly desirable and distinguishable, 62 will be presumed to confer upon
its owner sufficient market power to restrain competition in the tied
product.
Among the tying products that generally fall into this "unique"
category is real property. In Northern Pacific Railway v. United
States,63 the defendant railroad had conveyed real property subject to
"preferential routing" clauses that required the grantees to use the de-
fendant's railroad lines for shipping their products. In condemning
these conditional grants as illegal tying arrangements, the Supreme
Court concluded that "the defendant possessed substantial economic
power by virtue of its extensive landholdings." 64 Although no court
has held that the mere ownership of land creates substantial economic
power, Northern Pacific suggests that land, because of its uniqueness
and scarcity, frequently confers such power. Lower courts have tended
towards this conclusion.65 Because of the market power frequently
conferred by the uniqueness of land, and because of the ease with
which Sherman Act jurisdiction can be proven,66 the tying of condo-
minium sales to other facilities and services could often be held to be
illegal.
Although land is both unique and scarce, and every tract is a kind
of mini-monopoly, the irony of Northern Pacific should not be lost: the
uniqueness of land has always been an important justification for sub-
stantial federal deference to local decisionmaking. Contracts and torts
have a certain mobility and universality that makes substantial federal
regulation appropriate. However, the fact that each community's land
is unique often has inclined federal courts to give great weight to local
decisionmaking about land development and use.67
62. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews &
Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1977); see Fifth Moorings Condominium, Inc. v. Shere, 81
F.R.D. 712, 717 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
63. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
64. Id. at 7.
65. See Ware v. Trailer Mart, Inc., 623 F.2d 1150, 1153 (6th Cir. 1980); Fifth Moorings
Condominium, Inc. v. Shere, 81 F.R.D. 712, 716-17 (S.D. Fla. 1979). But see Levinson v.
Maison Grande, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 963, 967-68 (S.F. Fla. 1981); People ex rel. Scott v. Col-
lege Hills Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 651, 415 N.E.2d 1048 (1981) (decided under state law). See
generally Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L.
REv. 50, 57 (1958).
66. See notes 43-46 & accompanying text supra.
67. One of the great anomalies of the era of substantive due process was that the doc-
trine of liberty of contract was held not to apply to local land use regulations, even though
land use statutes could interfere with freedom of contract just as much as wage and hours
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Federal courts interpreting the antitrust laws have devised some
mechanisms for deferring to state or local regulation in areas in which
such deference seems to be appropriate. One such area is the state ac-
tion exemption from the federal antitrust laws.
The State Action Exemption
In 1943, the Supreme Court held in Parker v. Brown68 that certain
activities that would otherwise violate the federal antitrust laws may be
exempt if they are compelled by a state-created regulatory program.
The state action exemption from the federal antitrust laws is not consti-
tutionally mandated. It is predicated on the belief that Congress did
not intend to supplant certain state regulatory programs.69 The past
five years have seen a great deal of litigation with respect to the "state
action" exemption. 70 Only recently has the Supreme Court attempted
legislation. Compare Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (Suther-
land, J.) with Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 271 U.S. 525 (1923) (Sutherland, J.,); compare
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (Peckham, J.) with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 405
(1905) (Peckham, J.). See generally Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170
(1921); Miestre v City of Atlanta, 255 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1958) (per curiam); Ryckman, Land
Use Litigation, Federal Jurisdiction, and the Abstention Doctrine, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 377
(1981).
68. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Parker Court held that a state program for allocating the
supply of raisins in California and reducing surpluses was exempt from the federal antitrust
laws even though the same activity performed by raisin producers acting on their own would
almost certainly have been illegal per se. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3 10
U.S. 150, 223 (1940): "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and
with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity
in interstate or foreign commerce is illegalper se."
69. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943): "We find nothing in the lan-
guage of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a
state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." In Parker, the
Supreme Court made it clear that Congress could have enacted an antitrust statute that
would have prohibited the California raisin allocation program. Id. at 350. In reviewing the
legislative history of the antitrust laws, however, the Court found that Congress did not
intend to interfere so much with a state's regulatory policies.
In his dissent in Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W. 4144
(U.S. Jan. 13, 1982), Justice Rehnquist stated that the so-called state action exemption is not
an "exemption" from the antitrust laws. The question, according to Justice Rebnquist,
should not be exemption but preemption-to what extent do federal antitrust laws preempt
state and local regulation in our federal system? The distinction is important because within
the "exemption" paradigm the question courts ask is whether a state or city violates the
antitrust laws by enacting a certain statute. "[T]he gist of the Court's opinion is that a mu-
nicipality may actually violate the antitrust laws when it merely enacts an ordinance invalid
under the Sherman Act. . . ." Id. at 4150 n.2. Rather, Justice Rehnquist stated that the
question should simply be whether a particular state or municipal regulation has been pre-
empted by the federal antitrust laws. In the case of preemption, the appropriate remedy
would be an injunction against enforcement of the regulation.
70. E.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W. 4144 (Jan.
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to articulate a simple state action test,7' and many issues remain
unresolved.
There are some constitutional limits on the application of federal
antitrust laws to the states. The eleventh amendment 72 dictates that a
state cannot be a defendant in certain private actions.73 Under the
tenth amendment,74 certain traditional governmental functions of
states and political subdivisions are exempt from federal legislation en-
acted under the commerce clause.75 The tenth amendment has been
held to give an exemption from the antitrust laws to certain institutions
operated by a governmental subdivision in those cases in which the
institution was carrying on a traditional governmental function, such as
the operation of a prison store by the state prison authority.76 The state
action exemption goes beyond the tenth amendment exemption, how-
ever, to insulate private conduct that is subject to state regulation from
the antitrust laws. Land use regulations that require private builders to
build in a certain way are probably not covered by the tenth amend-
ment exemption, 77 but they may be included in the "state action" anti-
13, 1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975); Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980); Estate of
Effron, 117 Cal. App. 3d 915, 173 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1981).
71. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980). For a recent analysis and critique of the test, see Areeda, Antitrust Immunityfor
"State Action"After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435 (1981).
72. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
73. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3524 (Cum. Supp. 1980); Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmuni-
ties in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies
About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976).
74. U.S. CONST. amend X.
75. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
76. Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
77. Land use planning is a traditional governmental function, and an argument could
be made, based on National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), that land use
ordinances have an "exemption" from the federal antitrust laws under the tenth amendment
and the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. In National League of Cities, the court
held that a city did not have to pay its own employees the minimum wage as dictated by the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act. The precise holding was that federal legislation passed
under the commerce clause could not "operate to directly displace the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." Id. at 852.
The meaning of "integral operations" is unclear, but presumably there is a difference be-
tween a city's paying its own employees a wage below the federal minimum and its con-
tracting with a for-profit company to have work done under contracts providing that the
private company's employees would earn less than the minimum wage. In the condomin-
ium tying cases, the defendant generally is a private, profit-making developers who may be
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trust exemption.
Whether state and local land development statutes qualify for the
state action exemption has not been established. 78 State and local land
use and development ordinances raise at least two important questions:
whether such regulations fall within the scope of the "state action" ex-
emption, and whether the "state action" exemption applies to regula-
tions created by counties, cities, or other governmental subdivisions of
the state.
The Scope of the State Action Exemption
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court articulated a simple
"state action" test in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 79 At issue in Midcal was a state statute that
required retailers to sell wine at prices filed with the state by wholesal-
ers. The statute thus permitted wine wholesalers to engage in resale
price maintenance, a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.80
There was virtually no state supervision of the price-setting activities of
the wholesalers.
The Supreme Court held that the California statute did not create
an effective "state action" exemption from the antitrust laws. In ana-
lyzing the proper scope of the state action exemption, the Court devel-
oped a two-part standard. First, the "challenged restraint must be 'one
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.'" Sec-
ond, the policy must be actively supervised by the state itself.8 ' The
court held that California's statutory price maintenance requirement
passed the first part of the test but not the second. Although Califor-
nia's policy was clearly articulated, it was not actively supervised by the
state and amounted to nothing more than "a gauzy cloak of state in-
volvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing
acting pursuant to a local land use ordinance. A holding that the tenth amendment would
give a private developer an exemption from the antitrust laws even if its acts were mandated
by a city's rulemaking with respect to a clearly governmental activity would stretch the hold-
ing of National League of Cities significantly.
78. The proper scope of the state action exemption continues to be an area of heated
controversy. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W. 4144
(U.S. Jan. 13, 1981); Hybud Equip. Co. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981);
Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32,36-38 (1st Cir. 1981); Glenwillow Landfill, Inc. v. City of Akron,
485 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Woolen v. Surtrans Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025,
1028-32 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
79. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
80. See id. at 103.
81. 445 U.S. at 105.
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arrangement. 82
Mideal leaves unclear whether this standard should be applied to
state legislation that by its nature does not require administrative su-
pervision by the state. Many land development regulations create stan-
dards for uses and density, but leave most of the decisionmaking and
enforcement to the judiciary.
One example of such legislation is state regulation of condommii-
ums, such as Florida's leasehold condominium statute,83 which specifi-
cally authorizes developers to offer to purchasers the sale of a
condominium housing unit tied to a leasehold estate in certain common
recreational areas. The language of the Florida statute constitutes sub-
stantial state supervision of leasehold condominiums and corrects
many abuses that had occurred before the statute was passed; 84 how-
ever, the statute does not seem to provide a mechanism for the kind of
"active" administrative supervision contemplated in Midcal. The state
itself neither creates the condominium package nor requires prior ad-
ministrative review of any particular proposal. The state intervenes,
largely through the judiciary, only after a controversy arises. 85 Fur-
thermore, the Florida statute should not be regarded as a complete pol-
icy regarding leasehold condominiums. The antitrust laws can and
should protect against some arrangements that comply with local
statutes.86
State land development statutes, such as Florida's leasehold con-
82. Id. at 106.
83. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.401 (West Supp. 1981).
84. See text accompanying notes 128-32 infra.
85. The Supreme Court found state administrative supervision sufficient to create a
state action exemption from the antitrust laws in New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox
Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). A statutory scheme actively regulated by the judiciary itself can
qualify for the state action exemption. See Estate of Effron, 117 Cal. App. 3d 915, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 93 (198 1) (state statutory scheme under which probate judges compensated executors
exempt from Sherman Act); see also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (disciplinary
rules adopted and enforced by state supreme court); Foley v. Alabama State Bar, 648 F.2d
355 (5th Cir. 1981) (same). Effron, Bates, and Foley all involved active court administration,
and not merely dispute resolution.
86. For example, a developer could erect a grocery store on the common area and
require all condominium purchasers to shop there without violating the Florida statute. In
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), the Supreme Court
faced an analogous situation with respect to a city-operated public utility. In holding that
the city was not exempt from the antitrust laws, the Court noted that the city had been
granted a monopoly from the state for producing and delivering electricity in its area. The
Court said, however, that the monopoly grant was not a complete antitrust exemption:
"[Elven a lawful monopolist may be subject to antitrust restraints when it seeks to extend or
exploit its monopoly in a manner not contemplated by its authorization." Id. at 417; see also
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W. 4144 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1982).
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dominium statute, are not likely to satisfy the Midcal "active supervi-
sion" standard, and thus probably will not qualify for the state action
exemption. This would almost certainly be the result if a court per-
ceived a private developer as simply using the statute to cloak an anti-
trust violation. Florida's leasehold condominium act was not designed
to exempt the entire Florida leasehold condominium industry from an-
titrust scrutiny; too many activities that are not within the prohibitions
of the statute may nevertheless impose substantial restraints upon
consumers.
87
A federal court, on the other hand, could reasonably defer to the
Florida leasehold condominium statute or a similar state law when an-
alyzing the substantive elements of a particular antitrust claim. For
example, the leasehold condominium statute establishes government
approval of a package consisting of the sale of a condominium unit
plus the long-term lease of the common elements. This recognition
manifests a state interest in the integration of individual condominium'
units with common elements, even in those situations in which the inte-
gration is created by the sale of one part of the package and the long-
term lease of another part. If the only substance of an antitrust com-
plaint is a developer's offer of a condominium for sale on the condition
that the purchaser lease the common areas, then deference to state pol-
icy is appropriate when the federal court decides whether the package
constitutes a single "product" under the federal law of tying.88
Municipal Regulation and the State Action Exemption
Even if statutes like the Florida Condominium Act qualify for the
state action antitrust exemption, the problem of federal interference in
local land development policy remains unsolved. -Much regulation of
condominium development is carried out by municipal, not by state
governments. The second major issue raised by local land use planning
legislation is whether the state action exemption applies to governmen-
tal subdivisions of the state.89
87. See Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1976) ("state action" exemption
found not to apply to prior Florida condominium regulatory scheme). See generally Bos-
selman & Bonder, Potential Immunity of Land Use Control Systems from Civil Rights and
Antitrust Liability, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 453, 468-73 (1981).
88. See notes 104-05 & accompanying text infra.
89. The state action exemption from the antitrust laws must be distinguished from the
broad definition of "state action" used in civil rights litigation. The fourteenth amendment
concept of state action is expansive and applies to public officials at every governmental
level, and sometimes even to private persons acting under color of state law. See generally
L. TRIBE, AMERUCAN CONSTrrUUTIONAL LAW §§ 18-1 to -7 (1978 & Supp. 1979). On the
other hand, the antitrust "state action" exemption is strictly construed and generally applies
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In its recent decision in Community Communications Co., Inc. v.
City o1 Boulder,90 the Supreme Court substantially restricted the power
of municipalities to regulate business without violating the federal anti-
trust laws. The issue in Community Communications was whether a
state could transfer a part of its state action exemption to a city by
means of a home rule provision permitting the city to pass regulatory
legislation that would "supersede within the territorial limits . . . of
said city . . any law of the state in conflict therewith." 9'
Until 1979 the plaintiff was the only provider of restricted access
cable television services in the city of Boulder, Colorado. In the late
1970s, however, new satellite technology permitted such services to be
delivered by competing companies. Boulder's city council attempted to
assist a potential competitor's entry into the market by passing an ordi-
nance that prevented the plaintiff from expanding its services for three
months. The city council also announced that during the three-month
period it would draft an ordinance regulating entry and delivery of
services in Boulder's restricted-access television market. The plaintiff
sued, claiming that the moratorium violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
The Supreme Court held that under these facts the City of Boulder
did not have the benefit of the state action antitrust exemption. The
Boulder ordinance would qualify for the exemption only if it were "the
action of the State of Colorado itself in its sovereign capacity," or if it
constituted "municipal action in furtherance or implementation of
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. ' 92 In this
case the only state policy to which Boulder could look was the Colo-
rado home-rule provision, which did not pass the test:
[T]he requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expression"
is not satisfied when the State's position is one of mere neutrality re-
specting the municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive. A state
that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be said
to have "dontemplated" the specific anticompetitive actions for
which municipal liability is sought.93
It seems clear that anticompetitive municipal zoning legislation
will fare no better against an antitrust challenge than did Boulder, Col-
only to legislation and regulations of the state itself. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579,
590-91 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975); Rogers, Municipal
Antitrust Liability in a Federalist System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 306.
90. 50 U.S.L.W. 4144 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1982), reversing, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
91. CoLo. CoNsT. art XX, § 6.
92. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4146-47.
93. Id. at 4147 (emphasis in original).
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orado's cable television ordinance. The municipal power to zone gen-
erally is created by state home rule provisions or zoning enabling acts
that are "neutral" with respect to the question whether competition is
to be eliminated or retained in a particular market. 94
The "Separate Product" Rule
To prove an illegal tying arrangement, a plaintiff must show that
the tying product and the tied product are separate products.95 For
example, it is not illegal for a haberdasher to refuse to sell a hat without
its hatband, or for a shoestore to refuse to sell a left shoe without the
right. In both these cases, a court is likely to rule that the "tying" and
"tied" products are in fact a single product. A more difficult question is
whether a condominium coupled with a swimming pool, a garden, or
garbage collection facilities constitutes a single product.
94. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 2.15-.20 (2d ed. 1976); 5 P.
ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS §§ 35.02-.05 (1978); cf. Mason City Center
Ass'ns v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), in which the judge in a
zoning case engaged in analysis similar to that prescribed by the Community Communica-
tions decision. In Mason City, the court held that a municipal zoning statute might qualify
for the state action exemption if its restrictions were carried out "pursuant" to a state policy
of eliminating competition in a particular area. The Court concluded, however, that the
Iowa zoning enabling act "does not compel or contemplate anticompetitive agreements on
the part of Iowa municipalities." 468 F. Supp. at 743 (footnote omitted). One commentator
on the pre-Midcal case law suggested that to be exempt from the antitrust laws state legisla-
tion must manifest a clear intention to displace the antitrust laws as a regulatory program.
See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 57, 282-83 (1978); see also George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Bldrs., Inc, 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970). "[Valid govern-
ment action confers antitrust immunity only when government determines that competition
is not the summum bonum in a particular field and deliberately attempts to provide an alter-
nate form of public regulation." Id. at 30. The two-part test articulated in Midcal, however,
does not include this specific requirement of a stated intention to displace the market. On
the other hand, the statute at issue in Midcal clearly did eliminate competition. Further-
more, the issue in Midcal was not raised in the same terms. The requirement of a state
intent to create an antitrust exemption arguably is consistent with the Midcal test. It is
doubtful, however, that local land use planning statutes display such an intent to eliminate
the free market and create an exemption from the antitrust laws. Although zoning restric-
tions can have a penetrating effect on competition, see Mason City Center Ass'ns v. City of
Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), they are intended not to regulate competi-
tion, but rather to control the uses of land. Cf. Grendel's Den, Inc., v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88
(1st Cir. 198 1),prob.fivrir. noted, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3528 (U.S. Jan.
11, 1982) (No. 81-878), in which a restaurant challenged a Massachusetts statute prohibiting
the sale of alcoholic beverages within 500 feet of a church or school if the church or school
objected to the sale. The court concluded that the state action exemption did not apply
because there was no clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed policy of the state to
create the "anticompetitive effects" that the statute in fact created. Id. at 99-100.
95. See Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1980); Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
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In Chatham Condominium Associations v. Century Village, Inc. ,96
the pl.intiffs alleged that the defendants had illegally tied a ninety-
nine-year lease of commonly-held recreational property to the sale of
individual condominium units. The defendants argued that the indi-
vidual units and the common recreational areas composed a single
product, a "leisure living" package that the defendant was marketing.97
The circuit court suggested that tying arrangements in the condo-
minium market should be tested on a sliding scale:
At one end of the spectrum,. . . the requirement that purchasers of
condominiums also buy an undivided interest in certain common ar-
eas does not involve two separate products. At the other end of the
spectrum, however, it would clearly be improper to require condo-
minium purchasers to patronize, for example, a local shopping center
owned by the condominium developers; in this hypothetical situa-
tion, two separate products are clearly involved.98
The court, however, remanded the case for further argument on the
two-product issue. 99
Almost every product on the American market can be divided into
constituent parts and sold separately. The courts, however, are un-
likely to accede to a customer's demand that a defendant selling a
three-piece suit be forced to sell the pants alone, even if the pants alone
are a "separate" product. Generally, courts deciding whether two
items constitute two distinct "products" have relied more on common
sense than on economic analysis. °° Each of these decisions makes
96. 597 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1979).
97. Id. at 1012.
98. Id. at 1013.
99. Cf. Levinson v. Maison Grande, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 963 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (condomin-
ium and its swimming pool and parking lot constituted a single product).
100. For example, the installation of electric connections has been held to be the same
"product" as the electricity itself because provision of electric lines is merely an ancillary
service to providing electricity. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power
Co., 438 F.2d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 1971). The tying of a mandatory service and repair contract
to sales of a community antenna for remote communities has been held to be a single prod-
uct, because of the seller's interest in developing a reputation for quality and service in a
new market. See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aj'dper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Advertising in morning newspapers and adver-
tising in evening newspapers have beeh held to constitute a single product because the
"product" sold was not two advertisements but the single product of access to readership.
See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613-14 (1953). On the
other hand, a general news service, a business news service, and a regional news service
transmitted over the same facilities by a news gathering agency are three different products,
largely because the three services could probably be delivered separately and a substantial
number of customers would have preferred separate delivery. See Associated Press v. Taft-
Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 764 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 820 (1965).
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sense on its facts. Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts,
however, has articulated a generalized "single product" theory.
Courts have noted occasionally that efficiency should play an im-
portant role in questions of tying product determination, but have not
explained what "efficiency" means. 101 If a high percentage of custom-
ers prefer to buy two items together and it is cheaper for the defendant
to market the two together, and if the cost savings would be substan-
tially lost were the defendant additionally required to offer each item
separately, then the two items should be considered a single product for
purposes of the law of tying. For example, most shoe customers buy a
left shoe and a right shoe simultaneously. A relatively small number of
prospective purchasers enter the market for a left shoe alone. If a
shoestore were required to sell a left shoe to the occasional customer
who wanted one, the store would have increased costs for administra-
tion, stocking, returns, and accounting. These extra costs would be
passed on to all consumers. If the store refused to sell shoes except by
the pair, the benefit to the class of consumers who prefer their shoes by
the pair might be greater than the loss to the class of consumers who
want left shoes alone. In that case, society would benefit if the store
were not required to offer to sell a single left shoe. 02
Similarly, the tying of condominium sales to sales or leases of
common services and facilities may be more efficient than independent
sales. A purchaser of a condominium in a large development
purchases more than the space contained within the walls of his or her
unit. A condominium unit must include an interest in certain common
space, such as halls, exterior walls, and a common basement. In addi-
tion, a condominium is likely to be tied to an interest in certain com-
mon areas or facilities that are not absolutely necessary to the physical
101. See Anderson Foreign Motors v. New England Toyota Distributors, 475 F. Supp.
973, 982 (D. Mass. 1979) (integration in the manufacturing process could yield a conclusion
that two functionally distinct items were in fact a single product); ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (same).
102. The single-product test suggested here is derived from a variation of Pareto Op-
timality known as Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency. A particular rule is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if it
yields a distribution of resources such that if the resources were distributed any other way
the winners would not gain enough so that they could fully compensate the losers, whether
or not they actually compensate them. Under the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a
marketer of shoes should be able to tie left shoes to right shoes if customers for the combina-
tion, a pair of shoes, would gain more from the requirement than the potential customers of
a left or right shoe alone, who would be forced to buy a pair in order to acquire a single
shoe, would lose. See Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and_4uction: Philosophic Aspects of
the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980). The test assumes that the
goal of the antitrust laws is to maximize consumer welfare. See generally R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
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integrity of an individual home, but that nevertheless add to the quality
of life. The typical common space in a condominium development
might include a parking lot, a swimming pool, tennis courts or other
recreational facilities, a garden, a club house, a sauna, laundry facili-
ties, trash collection facilities, lawns and shrubbery, outdoor furniture,
and an external security service.' 0 3 It could impose a difficult, and per-
haps insurmountable, burden on developers to price various elements
of this common space individually and give purchasers a chance to
"opt out" of one item or another. The additional administrative costs
would be passed on to the purchasers. Furthermore, preventing those
who opt out from later using the facilities would create additional costs
and inefficiency. For example, although the technology might be avail-
able to ensure that only authorized participants use the common swim-
ming pool, the enforcement costs would be high and the security
devices could be offensive to the kind of atmosphere that condominium
dwellers would like to maintain. Those common items that could be
provided just as efficiently by independent sources, however, such as
trash collection service, may be "separate products" under an efficiency
analysis.
Although courts have often considered non-economic criteria in
deciding whether a tying item and a tied item constitute a single prod-
uct,' °4 one factor not generally considered is local law. Deference to
state and municipal land development policy could be a valuable
mechanism for harmonizing the federal antitrust laws with local regu-
lation. For example, if a federal court faced an allegation that a bicycle
salesperson was violating section 3 of the Clayton Act by refusing to
sell bicycles without headlights, the federal court ought to consider a
city ordinance that requires all bicycles sold within the city to be
equipped with headlights. It is unlikely that the framers of the antitrust
laws intended the Clayton Act to interfere in local policy to the ex-
tent of striking down such relatively unoffensive and valuable safety
ordinances. 0 5
103. See lB P. ROHAN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE, app. C-10, at 378.212
(1980) (sample condominium documents).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 (1962); Associated Press v.
Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 760-64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965).
105. If the regulation of safety equipment for bicycles is a traditional governmental ac-
tivity, the tenth amendment might create a special exemption from the antitrust laws. See
Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979); see general,y National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Local Land Use Policy as an Element of the "Separate Product"
Determination
Many applications of federal antitrust laws to tying arrangements
in real estate would not conflict with local policy. In such situations,
there is no reason for federal deference.I0 6 When federal law and local
land use policy conflict, however, because of a local determination of
what constitutes a single product, federal courts should defer to local
judgment. For example, local ordinances commonly require that a
condominium or apartment developer provide at least one off-street
parking space for each residential unit it sells. 10 7 In such a situation, a
federal court could quite appropriately consider local land use policy in
determining whether the living unit and the parking spaces are distinct
"products" for the purposes of the federal antitrust laws.
In general, the condominium market is regulated intensely by state
and local statutes. For example, the balance between condominium
living units and open recreational space is often dictated by municipal
ordinances, as part of a planned unit development or planned unit resi-
dential development. 08 Such ordinances evidence a municipality's
overall policy regarding housing density and the availability of open
recreational space. 0 9
106. For example, the tying of mobile home lots to mobile homes constitutes an illegal
tying arrangement under federal and many state antitrust laws. See note 2 & accompanying
text supra. Restrictive covenants that require purchasers to buy their building materials
from the seller, see note 4 & accompanying text supra, or to list their homes at the time of
resale with a particular selling agency, are also prohibited by antitrust laws. See note 3 &
accompanying text supra. In most cases, local government policy does not address such
restrictions.
107. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65850(d) (West Supp. 1980); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
MUNICIPAL CODE, PLANNING CODE art. 1.5, §§ 150-161 (1979).
108. The dramatic rise of the planned unit development in the late 1960s and the 1970s
was largely a product of the dramatic increase in the volume and cost of housing construc-
tion, and the continuing insistence of municipalities that open recreational space be pro-
vided in residential areas. See 5 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS §§ 32.01-
.02 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ZONING]. See generally Symposium: Planned Unit Develop-
ment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 3 (1965). Cluster housing in planned unit developments can save
money both in planning and construction and in ongoing maintenance. Furthermore, clus-
ter housing may enable groups of residents to purchase facilities, such as swimming pools,
that would be too expensive for the individual residents. Cluster development can provide
additional security for the elderly, as well as a certain amount of relief from the maintenance
and yard expense that ordinarily accompanies ownership of a single-family home. See
W.H. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE 225-52 (1970). See generally U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR,
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, TECHNICAL BULLETIN 1, WHERE NOT TO BUILD: A
GUIDE FOR OPEN SPACE PLANNING (1968); Lloyd, .4 Developer Looks at Planned Unit De-
velopment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 3 (1965).
109. See generally 5 ZONING, supra note 108, §§ 32.01-.02.
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Many cities today have density restrictions that limit the amount
of housing that can be placed on a particular tract of land and ensure
the availability of open land."10 In traditional subdivisions of single-
family homes, most of this open land consists of individually-owned
lots and yards, and the municipal restrictions take the form of mini-
mum lot-size requirements."' Planned unit developments, on the
other hand, operate as exceptions to these traditional allocations of
building space. In a planned unit development, the prevailing density
requirements apply to the entire development as a unit, rather than to
the individual lots. In this way, the developer is permitted to group or
"cluster" the housing into integrated units to save on construction costs.
In exchange for individual lots or yards of a certain size, the planned
unit development contains a common open space, which may be occu-
pied by recreational facilities such as tennis courts or swimming pools,
and which offsets the increased density of the housing itself." 2
A typical planned unit development is described in Orinda Home-
owners Committee v. Board of Supervisors."13 In Orinda Homeowners
Committee, the Board of Supervisors, on the recommendation of the
county planning commission, rezoned a 187 acre parcel for the devel-
opment of residential clusters mixed with single family homes. The
plan required that no more than eight units could be clustered on a
single acre and that the overall density of the project was to be about
two units per acre. Approximately 345 dwelling units were to be con-
structed. This overall density requirement reflected the density re-
quirements of the county's master plan. The proposal for the planned
unit development also required that each cluster within the parcel be
approved by the County Director of Planning." 14 The developer thus
was required by a local land use statute to offer both the individual
housing units and the common open land together; the housing could
not be built and sold unless the common open space was provided.
110. See generally 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 11.02-.08 (2d ed.
1976).
111. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE, PLANNING CODE art. 1.2, § 121
(1979).
112. See 5 ZONING, supra note 108, §§ 32.01-.02; Hanke, Planned Unit Development and
Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1965). Hanke defines a planned unit develop-
ment as "a residential land subdivision of individually owned homes with neighborhood
owned open areas and recreation facilities." Id. at 18.
113. 11 Cal. App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
114. Id. at 772, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 90. The case, not an antitrust case, held that the rezon-
ing was valid.
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The planned unit development is generally more intensely regu-
lated than ordinary single-family development because control of com-
mon buildings and land areas can generate a host of problems.11 5
Despite their economic advantages, planned unit developments have
some inherent liabilities. The common, open property is necessarily
shared space, and some owners receive more value from it than others.
Certain decisions that the single-family homeowner makes alone must,
in a planned unit development, be made by a group.
In most municipalities, proposed condominium developments are
subject to subdivision and zoning restrictions, just as any other residen-
tial project would be. Some states have enacted condominium statutes,
however, that effectively deprive municipalities of a great deal of this
power. In any case, land use in the condominium development is in-
tensely regulated by either municipal or state authority. 16
The application of the federal antitrust law of tying to planned
unit developments presents an interesting analytical problem. A devel-
oper who sells a house only on the condition that the purchaser also
buy the front yard does not violate the federal antitrust laws, particu-
larly when the existence and minimum size of the front yard are dic-
tated by state or municipal density restrictions. A house and its yard
115. See generally 5 ZONING, supra note 108, §§ 32.01-.02.
116. Most state statutes regulating condominiums provide that condominium develop-
ments must comply with local subdivision and zoning ordinances, including local provisions
with respect to planned unit developments. A few states, however, create special exemptions
for condominium projects. See 4B R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 633.32 (1979) (survey of state provisions). The 1977 Florida Condominium Act provides
that condominiums shall conform to local zoning ordinances, with the qualification that
"such requirement[s] shall be equally applicable to all buildings and improvements of the
same kind not then, or thereafter to be, subjected to the condominium form of ownership."
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.507 (West Supp. 1981). Thus, under the Florida statute a condomin-
ium development would be subject to local zoning regulation. See David v. B. & J. Holding
Corp., 349 So. 2d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). In general, local zoning ordinances apply
to condominiums in California. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1981): "Unless a
contrary intent is clearly expressed, local zoning ordinances shall be construed to treat like
structures, lots, or parcels in like manner regardless of whether the ownership thereof is
divided by sale of condominiums or into community apartments ...." See also Norsco
Enterprises v. City of Fremont, 54 Cal. App. 3d 488, 126 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1976). For a discus-
sion of the application of planned unit development ordinances to condominiums in Califor-
nia, see 13 W. BIEL & C. SENEKER, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE: LAW & PRACTICE § 471.05
(1981). Some municipalities have passed zoning ordinances that virtually prohibit condo-
minium construction. See Transland Properties, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 18 N.C. App.
712, 198 S.E.2d 1 (1973). Other municipalities have been required by state law to permit
condominium development. See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341
N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). See generally Welfeld, The Condominium and Median-
Income Housing, 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 457 (1963); Note, Condominiums and Zoning, 48 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 957 (1974); Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 866 (1976).
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are a single "product" for the purpose of the tying laws. In a planned
unit development, twenty housing units might be clustered into a single
building on one end of a parcel, while an open recreational area the
size of twenty typical yards is located at the other end. Consistency
with a community's general master plan might dictate such a require-
ment, and the general theory of land-use planning suggests that high-
density housing should be offset by a certain amount of open land. 117
On the other hand, when housing and open land are segregated, the
two begin to look more like distinct "products" and the development
begins to resemble a tying arrangement.
The "separate product" rule provides an excellent basis for federal
antitrust deference to state or local policy. In a planned unit develop-
ment, the relationship between individually owned housing units and
common recreational land areas is a product of a local statute that rep-
resents a substantial effort by local government to "integrate" the living
situation of the homeowner. Planned unit development rests on a local
determination that a certain amount of integration between living ac-
commodations and the availability of open space is good for the com-
munity. As the Supreme Court of Florida noted, under Florida law,
"tying recreational facilities to housing is at the heart of the condomin-
ium concept, a concept which has been repeatedly sanctioned both by
the legislature and by the courts . ..." 118 If a state has developed
such a relevant land use policy, then federal courts applying the federal
antitrust laws ought to credit that judgment and regard the condomin-
ium unit and the recreational land as a single "product."
117. See, e.g., 2 ZONING, supra note 108, § 12.01[1], at 12-2 & nn.1-2 (1978); U.S. DEP'T
OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANGEMENT, TECHNICAL BULLETIN 1, WHERE NOT TO
BUILD: A GUIDE FOR OPEN SPACE PLANNING (1968).
118. Avila South Condominium Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599, 607 (Fla. 1977).
See also Daytona Dev. Corp. v. Bergquist, 308 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), in
which the plaintiff, a condominium purchaser, sought to quiet his title with respect to an
interest in the common recreational areas. In Daytona, the Declaration of Condominium
required by state law described the common recreational area, but the purchaser's grant
failed to convey to him a pro rata share in it. The court considered the Florida Condomin-
ium Act, 1963 Fla. Laws ch. 63-35, § 3(8) (repealed 1977) (current version at FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 718.103(9) (West Supp. 1981)), which defined a condominium parcel as "a unit to-
gether with the undivided share in the common elements which is appurtenant to the unit."
The court concluded that under Florida law "all condominium units have an undivided
share of the common elements and neither can exist separately from the other." Id. at 550.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court judgment quieting the plaintifi's title and effec-
tively reforming the plaintiffs deed to include an interest in the common areas.
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Areas for Stricter Antitrust Scrutiny
Not every aspect of condominium projects should be outside the
reach of the federal antitrust laws, even if local statutes require the
buyer to take an interest in the common elements. The tied products
and services provided by some sellers exceed the policy governing local
land use statutes and impose restraints that local regulations either do
not contemplate or do not deal with effectively.
The contrast between two types of alleged tying arrangements that
have been the subject of federal litigation illustrates the differences be-
tween areas appropriate and inappropriate to federal antitrust law.
The first involves the tying of a sale of a condominium unit and the
lease, rather than the sale, of common land." 9 The second involves a
developer's requirement that the condominium buyer employ the de-
veloper or an agent to service and maintain the common areas.' 20
Characteristic of both of these arrangements is that the seller or devel-
oper maintains a profitable interest in the property for a long time after
the purchaser has acquired his or her interest.
Leasehold Condominiums
Several recent antitrust cases have involved allegations that the
defendant-developer was illegally tying the sale of the individual con-
dominium unit to the long-term lease of the common recreational
land and facilities. 12' Such condominium packages, commonly called
"leasehold condominiums," '122 create great potential for abuse not ex-
119. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
120. See, e.g., Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1976).
121. See, e.g., Chatham Condominium Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002
(5th Cir. 1979); Sandles v. Ruben, 89 F.R.D. 635 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Fifth Moorings Condo-
minium, Inc. v. Shere, 81 F.R.D. 712 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
122. Some commentators, such as Professors Powell and Rohan, would use the term
"leasehold condominium" to apply only to those developments in which the structural units,
to be purchased in fee, sit on land all of which is conveyed under a long-term lease. See 4B
R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 633.34[2], at 900.135 n.39 (1979).
Professors Powell and Rohan would distinguish this situation from the one in which the
structures and the land beneath them are acquired by the purchasers in fee but the recrea-
tional facilities are leased. Id. § 633.35 [3], at 912.1-912.2. However, the statutes generally
do not make such a distinction. See UNIFORM PLANNED COMMUNITY Acr § 1-103. The
Florida Condominium Act of 1977 contains a provision on leasehold condominiums that
states the following: "A condominium may be created on lands held under lease or may
include recreational facilities or other common elements or commonly used facilities on a
leasehold ....." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.401 (West Supp. 1981). The Uniform Condomin-
ium Act generally bars the "leasehold condominium" that consists of a fee estate in the
condominium unit and ground beneath but a separate leasehold estate in certain recrea-
tional property. See UNIFORM CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-105. However, the Uniform Act
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isting in the simple sale of a condominium with an undivided interest
in the common property. Unless restrained by statute or contract, the
lessor is free to raise rents without limit on the common land. The
lessee may avoid rent increases by selling the condominium unit and
moving out, but is unlikely to do so after establishing a home there.
Therefore, the lessee may have little bargaining power with the
lessor. 123
Nevertheless, the leasehold condominium concept can provide a
valuable service by enabling a prospective purchaser to qualify for
home financing. In a traditional condominium package, the buyer
must qualify for a mortgage loan sufficient to purchase both the unit
and an interest in the common elements. In a leasehold condominium,
however, the buyer purchases only the individual unit and leases the
rest. The purchase price, and therefore the loan for which he or she
must qualify, is proportionately smaller. I24
would permit a temporary leasehold estate in recreational areas, which would eventually
revert to the developer. See id. § 2-107. Both the Uniform Act and the recently drafted
Model Condominium Code are discussed in Rohan, The "'Model Condominium Code'"--A
Blueprint For Modernizing Condominium Legislation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 587 (1978). In
general, Professor Rohan is opposed on policy grounds to the concept of the leasehold con-
dominium. Id. at 598. For a recent definition of the leasehold condominium in California,
see Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981).
123. In some states, statutes regulating leasehold condominiums may protect lessees.
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.401 (West Supp. 1981); see UNIFORM PLANNED COMMUNITY
ACT § 2-106. See generally I P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW & PRACTICE
(pt. 3) § 15B.09 (1981); IA id. § 18A.04.
124. Although the legal differences between a purchase subject to a mortgage and a
conveyance by lease are substantial, the economic differences are not. A lease-purchase plan
under which the homebuyer purchases the condominum unit but leases the interest in the
common recreational area is a mechanism for sharing the risk of the mortgagee somewhat
analogous to the provision of first and second mortgages by two different mortgagees. In the
lease-purchase plan, a financial institution provides the capital for the purchase of the con-
dominum unit, while the developer, as the lessor, invests the capital for long-term ownership
of the common elements. Each holds its own separate reversionary interest or right of re-
entry if the buyer defaults. In this way, the mortgagee effectively finances a substantially
smaller percentage of the entire package; its risk is reduced, and the amount of money it is
loaning is smaller. A bank might be willing to loan a particular buyer enough money to
finance the purchase element of a lease-purchase plan, while it would be unwilling to finance
a purchase of the entire package. In short, by buying the condominium and leasing the
common recreational areas, a purchaser might be able to qualify for a bank loan, while he or
she would not be able to qualify to purchase the entire package. For arguments that some
purchasers might be able to qualify for a leasehold condominium, but not for a complete
purchase, see D. CLURMAN & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 146-56
(1970). The authors estimated that, during the 1950s, units in Florida leasehold cooperatives
sold on the average for prices one third less than comparable units in fee cooperatives. Id. at
148; see also Levinson v. Maison Grande, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 963, 968 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (lease-
purchase arrangement can lower purchase price); 4B R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY § 633.34[2] (1979) (financial advantages of marketing condominiums bot-
[Vol. 33
TYING ARRANGEMENTS
For this reason, some states explicitly recognize and authorize
leasehold condominiums. 25 The recently drafted Uniform Planned
Community Act, a model for state regulation, provides that the decla-
ration establishing a leasehold planned community "shall allocate a
fraction or percentage of the common expenses of the association...
to each unit in the planned community, and state the formulas used to
establish those allocations."' 26 Under the Uniform Act, the leasehold
interest in the common area must be allocated to all the owners of the
individual units, on a per-unit basis.' 27 Purchasers of a single condo-
minium unit would not be permitted to opt out of their leasehold inter-
est in the common elements. The Uniform Planned Community Act
thus creates precisely the situation that several purchasers have com-
plained of as illegal tying arrangements.
By proper regulation, however, local legislators can turn a poten-
tially harmful arrangement into one beneficial to home buyers. Flor-
ida's Condominium Act,' 28 for example, provides several safeguards
against abuse. It gives the association of condominium owners a quali-
fied right of first refusal if the lessor ever decides to sell its interest in
the common elements. 129 It declares void on public policy grounds any
provision in a lease that permits the lessor to escalate the annual rental
fee beyond a fixed percentage. 130 Finally, it requires that in all lease-
hold condominiums the lease term be at least fifty years,' 3' and that
rent not be collected for promised facilities until they are completed. 32
tomed on a leasehold in the land). One advantage of the lease-purchase arrangement is a
possible reduction in the down payment. One commentator estimates that a unit requiring a
downpayment of $8000 if purchased entirely in fee would require only $6800 down if part of
a leasehold purchase. See generally 4A P. ROHAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCING, ch. 4 (1976).
125. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.401 (West Supp. 1981).
126. UNIFORM PLANNED COMMUNITY AcT § 2-107(a).
127. Id. § 2-107(b): "If units may be added to or withdrawn from the planned commu-
nity, the declaration must state the formulas to be used to reallocate the allocated interests
among all units included in the planned community after the addition or withdrawal." (em-
phasis added).
128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.101-.622 (West Supp. 1981).
129. Id. § 718.401(6)(b).
130. Id. § 718.401(8)(a).
131. Id. § 718.401, which provides in part that "[a] condominium may be created on
lands held under lease or may include recreational facilities or other common elements or
commonly used facilities on a leasehold, if, on the date the first unit is conveyed by the
developer to a bona fide purchaser, the lease has an unexpired term of at least 50 years." See
also CAL. CIV. CODE § 783 (West Supp. 1981) (condominium defined as an estate in real
property which may be "either (I) an estate of inheritance or perpetual estate, (2) an estate
for life or (3) an estate for years, such as a leasehold or a subleasehold."); Laguna Royale
Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981).
132. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.401(5) (West Supp. 1981).
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The Florida Condominium Act may create a state action exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws and thus place leasehold condominiums
that comply with the Florida statute beyond the reach of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts. 133 At the same time, the Act effectively authorizes
the leasehold condominium in Florida, 134 and could thus provide the
rationale for a federal court to decide that the purchase of a condomin-
ium unit and the lease of the recreational facilities are one "product"
for the substantive requirements of the tying laws.' 35
By enacting a comprehensive statute rather than simply banning
leasehold condominiums, state legislators are declaring a policy that
leasehold condominiums are a valuable mechanism for providing own-
er-occupied housing. Application of federal antitrust laws here would
not only frustrate the land-use goals of state legislators, but would reg-
ulate in an area that needs no additional regulation.
Tied Maintenance Contracts
Other condominium tying arrangements, not involving land use
policy, may allow more room for federal intrusion. In Miller v.
Granados, 36 a class action tying suit brought by condominium owners
under the Sherman Act, the owners charged that the developer tied the
sale of individual condominium units to an "operational management
agreement" under which the developer provided various goods and
maintenance services to the condominium development. The agree-
ment, which was forced upon the unit purchasers, provided for a quar-
terly fee to be paid to the management for these services and provided
that this fee could be increased periodically in accordance with the
Cost of Living Index.137 The district court dismissed the action, but the
Fifth Circuit remanded, noting that the claim might state a cause of
133. But see notes 79-88 & accompanying text supra.
134. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.401 (West Supp. 1981); cf. Porter v. Hollander, 494 F.
Supp. 151 (D. Del. 1980) (diversity case recognizing leasehold condominiums under Dela-
ware law); Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136
(1981) (recognizing the leasehold condominium under California law); Wiley v. Berg, 282
Or. 9, 578 P.2d 384 (1978) (tacitly recognizing leasehold condominium).
135. See Point East One Condominium Corp. v. Point East Devs., 348 So. 2d 32, 37
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977): "A recreational facilities lease is recognized by... [Florida] law
as a valid adjunct to a condominum purchase." But see id. at 37-40 (Hubbart, J., dissenting)
(leasehold condominiums authorized by state statute may nevertheless be illegal under state
and federal antitrust laws). See also Ackerman v. Spring Lake of Broward, Inc., 260 So. 2d
264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
136. 529 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1976).
137. Id. at 395.
[Vol. 33
action under federal antitrust laws.138
Tying arrangements under which developers force maintenance
contracts onto unit purchasers are generally subject to minimal state
regulation. If such state regulation is absent, use of the federal antitrust
laws on behalf of purchasers is appropriate. State governments, how-
ever, might perceive a value in developer maintenance contracts and
permit them, subject to active regulation by the state.
A developer's maintenance contract with each condominium own-
er can benefit both the developer and the public during the period in
which the developer is selling condominium units, but still owns a sig-
nificant number of them. When a developer is trying to market the
development, it has an interest in the maintenance and general appear-
ance of the development. For this reason, Florida's Condominium Act
requires that any reservation made by the developer "prior to assump-
tion of control of the association by unit owners" permitting the devel-
oper to provide management and maintenance services "shall be fair
and reasonable."1 39 The Florida Act also provides a mechanism by
which the association, once it has obtained control, may be released
from this initial obligation. When seventy-five percent of the owner-
ship in the individual units has passed to the purchasers, the purchasers
can cancel the initial management contract by a vote of seventy-five
percent or more of the individual owners. 4° Finally, the Florida Act
declares "void for public policy" any clause in the management's main-
tenance contract reservation that permits it to escalate the management
fees. 141
These provisions of the Florida Condominium Act are generally a
more efficient mechanism for protecting the condominium developers
and purchasers than are the federal antitrust laws. The Act recognizes
and administers at the state level the developer's interest in the mainte-
nance of a condominium development's common areas during the tran-
sitional period of construction and marketing. The federal antitrust
laws also have recognized a value in a seller's control over maintenance
138. Id. at 396-97.
139. See FLA. STAT. ANN.. § 718.302(1) (West Supp. 1981); sf. Point East Management
Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 921 (1976) (decided under prior version of statute).
140. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.302(1)(a) (West Supp. 1981).
141. Id. § 718.302(4). The provisions of the statute, however, may not apply with re-
spect to agreements entered into before the statute was passed. See Fleeman v. Case, 342
So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1977); see also Kaufman v. Shere, 347 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
Whether the federal antitrust laws should apply in a case in which enforcement of the state
statute would constitute impairment of a previously existing contract is a different question.
In such a case, the absence of state regulation should invite federal scrutiny.
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of a product during an initial period of marketing and development. 142
Moreover, the Florida statute provides a mechanism by which the indi-
vidual owners can relieve themselves of the burden of this "tying ar-
rangement" when the developer's legitimate interest has expired. In
such a situation, it would be appropriate for the federal courts to defer
to state policy and hold that the sale of a condominium unit and the
developer's provision of maintenance for the common elements are
"one product" during this initial developmental phase.
Conclusion
Several recent tying arrangement cases have involved alleged re-
straints in the residential housing market. Often the substance of these
tying arrangement claims lies in an area that is regulated by state or
local government.
Federal antitrust intervention into state and local land develop-
ment policy presents a novel use of the Sherman and Clayton Acts that
was not contemplated by their framers. As a matter of policy, federal
law should not intrude too deeply into such state and local regulation.
This is particularly true when the federal interest to be protected per-
tains to regulation of the marketplace and not to some important feder-
ally-protected individual right, such as the right to be free from race or
sex discrimination. The antitrust laws generally fall into the first of
these categories.
Under current law, the commerce clause of the United States Con-
stitution is not an effective limit on the intrusion of federal antitrust law
into the locally regulated housing market. Two limitations within the
antitrust laws, however, can restrain excessive federal intervention.
First, the "state action" exemption can place qualifying state regulatory
programs out of reach of the federal antitrust laws. Although the state
action exemption has been well-developed in some areas, its precise
boundaries with respect to local land use regulation are uncertain. Sec-
ond, a tying arrangement must involve separate tying and tied prod-
ucts. When determining whether two products are separate, a federal
court ought to defer to a local determination that the two belong
together.
142. See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aqf'dper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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